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1. THE COURT’S WORKLOAD AND INSTITUIONAL/PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
The European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court”), sitting in plenary 
session, elected a new President, Dean Spielmann, who took office on 1st November 
2012.1 President Spielmann is the judge elected in respect of Luxembourg and he has 
been a member of the Court since 2004. He has senior management experience within 
the Court, including serving as a Section President. A distinguishing feature of his 
appointment is that he is younger, fifty years-old, than his three predecessors as 
Presidents of the full-time Court. 
 In September 2012 the Court issued guidance regarding its approach to unilateral 
declarations by Member States acknowledging breaches of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention” or “ECHR”).2 The publication of the 
guidelines was timed to coincide with the entry into force, on 1st September 2012, of the 
latest version of the Rules of Court. The latter document contains new Rule 62A3 
governing unilateral declarations. Unilateral declarations are normally made by a 
Member State after the failure of, confidential, friendly settlement negotiations between 
the applicant and the respondent State. According to Rule 62A(1)(c) the State must file 
its unilateral declaration in public adversarial proceedings. The guidance elaborates that 
if the applicant accepts the unilateral declaration then the case will be struck-out. 
However, even if the applicant is not willing to accept the unilateral declaration the Court 
has the authority4 to strike-out the application if the Court considers that the continued 
examination of the application is not justified. Under the terms of the guidance the 
following, non-exhaustive, conditions must be satisfied before the Court will be willing to 
strike-out an application against the wishes of the applicant. 

Existence of sufficiently well-established case-law in the matter raised by the 
application.  
Clear acknowledgment of a violation of the Convention in respect of the applicant – 
with an explicit indication of the nature of the violation.  
Adequate redress, in line with the Court’s case-law on just satisfaction.  
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Where appropriate undertakings of a general nature (amendment of legislation or 
administrative practice, introduction of new policy, etc.).  
Respect for human rights: the unilateral declaration must provide a sufficient basis for 
the Court to find that respect for human rights does not require the continued 
examination of the application.5  
 
If the Court determines that a particular unilateral declaration meets these conditions 
then the relevant application can be struck-out. The guidance explains that if the 
respondent State does not provide the individual measures of redress promised in its 
unilateral declaration then the aggrieved applicant will be able to request the Court to 
reinstate his/her complaint. 
 The unilateral declaration/striking-out process is a mechanism that enables the 
Court to efficiently resolve straightforward repetitive cases, i.e. those not raising new 
legal issues for the Court. Recent years have witnessed a massive expansion in the 
resolution of cases via this process. According to the guidance in 2007 it was used in 30 
cases and by 2011 the process was applied in 692 cases.6 But, Professor, now Judge, 
Keller, expressed concern, based on her academic research, that the Court has been too 
willing to accept some unilateral declarations.7 Therefore, it is to be hoped that the new 
guidance demonstrates that the Court is going to adopt a robust attitude towards the 
assessment of whether particular unilateral declarations should be accepted or not. 
 
 During 2012 the Court delivered 1,093 judgments.8 The Grand Chamber accepted 
seven cases to be referred (appealed) under Article 43 of the ECHR and eight cases were 
relinquished to the Grand Chamber by Chambers under Article 30.9 The most significant 
development in the processing of complaints by the Court in 2012 was the large increase 
in the number of inadmissible applications determined by single-judge formations. 
Almost 82,000 such applications were declared inadmissible or struck-out by single-
judge formations in 2012.10 That was almost double the number of applications dealt 
with by single-judges in the previous year. By maximising the utilisation of single-judge 
formations the Court was able to reduce its case load backlog by 16% during 2012 (in 
January 2012 the backlog was 151,600 applications and by the end of December 2012 it 
had been reduced to 121,100 pending applications).11 Consequently, 2012 was the first 
year in the history of the full-time Court, created by Protocol 11, that saw a reduction in 
the number of pending cases. The Court hopes to be able to continue reducing the 
backlog, whilst recognising that it is still far too large. Russian and Turkey retained the 
unenviable position of the two Member States with the largest numbers of applications 
pending against them. The UK became the Member State with the ninth biggest total of 
pending cases (3,300), with the expanding number of prisoners complaining about their 
disqualification from voting the likely cause of this increase in applications.  
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 In April 2013 the Council of Europe announced that its negotiators and 
representatives of the European Union (EU) had settled the terms of the draft accession 
agreement for the EU to become a party to the ECHR.12 This has been a protracted 
process that formally began in the summer of 2010, after the coming into force of 
Protocol 14 which revised the ECHR to enable accession by the EU.13 President 
Spielmann had publicly urged the parties to overcome the remaining obstacles in their 
negotiations. 
Admittedly, some doubts have been expressed about the usefulness of the 
accession, in view of certain difficulties encountered during the negotiations. That 
is quite understandable and nobody expected them to be easy, given the scale of 
the task. Those difficulties, however, must not serve as a pretext for calling into 
question this noble endeavour. By acceding to the Convention and thereby allowing 
external judicial supervision of its action, the European Union will prove that, like 
its member States, it is willing for its action to be bound by the same international 
requirements as those applying to the action of individual States. A hallmark of 
credibility, the external review by the European Court of Human Rights will also be 
a hallmark of progress. It will represent a powerful message from Europe to the 
world, indeed a solemn declaration that beyond all its differences and specificities, 
however legitimate, be they occasional, regional or systemic, Europe shares a 
common foundation of fundamental rights, which we call human rights. The time 
has now come for the negotiators to bring their work to fruition and for the 
European Union, recent recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, to sign up to the 
Convention.14 
 
 The draft agreement will be sent to the EU Court of Justice for its formal view on the 
substance of the text. 
 
 
ARTICLE 1: FURTHER LIABILITY OF RUSSIA FOR BREACHES OF THE CONVENTION IN 
TRANSDNIESTRIA 
A Grand Chamber, subject to the dissent of the Russian Judge Kovler, found Russia 
liable, under Article 1, for the infringement of 170 school pupils and their parents’ right 
to education guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) in Catan and Others v 
Moldova and Russia15. Eight years earlier, in the well-known case of Ilascu and Others v 
Moldova and Russia16, another Grand Chamber had found Russia liable for the torture of 
one of the applicants in the self-proclaimed “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestra 
(“MRT”). However, in the latest case the Russian government challenged the Court’s 
interpretation of the concept of jurisdiction given in Ilascu and the more recent judgment 
in Al-Skeini and Others v UK17 (analysed in my rapport last year18). Before the Grand 
Chamber in Catan the Russian government contended that jurisdictional liability under 
Article 1 should only apply to the territory of a Member State. Alternatively the Russian 
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government claimed that, unlike in Ilascu and  in respect of the UK in Al-Skeini, none of 
its military forces had been involved in any infringements of the applicants’ right to 
education, indeed  Russia submitted that it had sought to act as a mediator in the 
dispute over the applicants’ schools.   
 During the break-up of the former USSR, in June 1990, Moldova proclaimed its 
sovereignty, it was the successor State to the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic 
(created in 1940) and included a strip of land on the eastern bank of the Dniester river 
(now called Transdniestria)). In September 1990 separatists announced the creation of 
the “MRT”. During 1991-92 there were armed clashes, resulting in several hundred 
deaths. The Court in Ilascu, found that elements of the Russian army based in 
Transdniestria helped the separatist, particularly by supplying them with large amounts 
of arms and ammunition from Russian stocks in Transdniestria. As a result of this 
Russian military aid the Moldovan forces were unable to gain control over Transdniestria. 
Russia undertook to withdraw its military forces from Transdniestria by the end of 2003, 
as part of the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe (1999), but it did not comply. The “MRT” has not been recognised by the 
international community. 
 The “MRT” “Constitution” provides that the official languages are “Moldavian”, 
Russian and Ukrainian.  A “MRT” “Law” passed in 1992 required that “Moldavian” had to 
be written with the Cyrillic alphabet and it was made an administrative offence 
(punishable with a fine) for a person in public or other organisations to breach “MRT” 
laws concerning the use of languages. During 1994 the “MRT” authorities banned the use 
of the Latin script in schools and in 2004 those authorities  started closing down schools 
using that script. 
 The applicants were children/their parents attending three schools using the Latin 
script. Regarding the  Evrica School the “MRT” police forcibly entered the school in July 
2004 and evicted the children/teachers/parents who were inside. Following the 
intervention of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe the “MRT” 
authorities permitted the school to re-open in different (inferior) premises from October 
2004. The Moldovan government has paid for the school and its staff.  The school uses 
the Latin script. The Alexandru cel Buri school had its water and electricity supplies cut 
off by the “MRT” authorities during July 2004. It was allowed to re-open in different 
premises (that cannot be reached by public transport) in September 2004. The school is 
supported by the Moldovan government and uses the Latin script. However, its pupil 
numbers have halved between 2002 and 2009. The Stefan cel Mare school, which used 
the Latin script, was stormed by “MRT” police in August 2004 with the 
pupils/teachers/parents being evicted. The Moldovan government arranged for the 
school to be relocated to a village 20km away in an area under its control. The 
pupils/parents claim  that the pupils are harassed by “MRT” officials when then travel to 
and from the school. 
 On the issue of the jurisdictional responsibility of Russia the Grand Chamber 
reaffirmed its Al-Skeini approach that Article 1 primarily applied to Member States’ 
national territories, but that exceptional forms of extra-territorial responsibility were also 
recognised in the Court’s jurisprudence. Given that the events in this case arose during 
the same time-frame as in Illascu it was for Russia to satisfy the Court that it was not 
liable under Article 1. The Grand Chamber concluded that: 
…the Russian Government have not persuaded the Court that the conclusions it 
reached in 2004 in the Ilaşcu judgment were inaccurate. The “MRT” was 
established as a result of Russian military assistance. The continued Russian 
military and armaments presence in the region sent a strong signal, to the “MRT” 
leaders, the Moldovan Government and international observers, of Russia’s 
continued military support for the separatists. In addition, the population were 
dependent on free or highly subsidised gas supplies, pensions and other financial 
aid from Russia. 
122. The Court, therefore, maintains its findings in the Ilaşcu judgment, that 
during the period 2002-2004 the “MRT” was able to continue in existence, resisting 
Moldovan and international efforts to resolve the conflict and bring democracy and 
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the rule of law to the region, only because of Russian military, economic and 
political support.  In these circumstances, the “MRT”‘s high level of dependency on 
Russian support provides a strong indication that Russia exercised effective control 
and decisive influence over the “MRT” administration during the period of the 
schools’ crisis. 
123. It follows  that the applicants in the present case fall within Russia’s 
jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention.19 
 
The Grand Chamber, unanimously, also found that Moldova had jurisdictional 
responsibility for the events complained of as it was the recognised territorial State 
under public international law. 
 In his dissenting opinion Judge Kovler referred back to his dissent in Illascu. 
Regarding the current complaints he emphasised that there was no evidence of direct 
involvement by Russian personnel in the closure of the applicants’ school. He also 
believed that  the majority’s conclusions regarding Russia’s jurisdictional responsibility 
contained “strong political overtones”. 
 In respect of the applicants’ complaints under P1-2 the majority of the Grand 
Chamber determined that the interruption of the applicants’ schooling  did not pursue a 
legitimate aim (it was aimed at the Russification of the language and culture of the 
people living in Transdniestria as part of the “MRT” goal of unification with Russia). 
Therefore a breach of that Article had occurred and Russia was liable as it exercised 
effective control over the “MRT” at that time. The Grand Chamber was united in ruling 
that Moldova had not breached P1-2 as it had taken all the measures it could to regain 
control over Transdniestria and it had provided specific measures to help the applicants’ 
continue their education using the Latin script. Judge Kovler voted for no violations of 
this Article in respect of both Russia and Moldova as he criticised the majority for 
“judicial activism” in extending the ambit of the right to education beyond its established 
limits. The majority of the Grand Chamber required Russia to pay each applicant 6,000 
euros just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage they had suffered. 
 The above judgment is an unequivocal confirmation of the Court’s contemporary 
approach to jurisdiction under Article 1. The Grand Chamber decisively rejected Russia’s 
argument that the Court should curtail the extra-territorial liabilities of Member States 
elaborated last year in Al-Skeini. What is much more uncertain is the long-term effect 
this judgment will have on Russia’s attitude towards the ECHR and the Court. The 
Court’s adverse judgment against Russia in Illascu was believed to be one of the factors 
that prompted the Russian authorities to delay ratification of Protocol 14’s institutional 
reforms for several years. We shall have to wait to see if Russia seeks to obstructs the 
next phase of the Strasbourg reform process. 
 
ARTICLE 3: COLLABORATION WITH THE CIA’s EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 
PROGRAMME 
At the end of 2012 a unanimous Grand Chamber delivered its lengthy judgment in EL-
Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia20, which found multiple breaches of 
the Convention regarding the respondent State’s collaboration with the United States of 
America’s covert extraordinary rendition programme. The Court defined extraordinary 
rendition as “an extra-judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to 
another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal 
system, where there was a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment”.21 According to the applicant, a German national, on 31 December 2003 he 
was travelling on a bus from Germany to Skopje for the purpose of taking a short 
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holiday in the latter city. At the Serbian/Macedonian border officials of the latter State 
became suspicious of his new German passport. After seven hours of interrogation, 
during which he was questioned about links with Islamic groups, he was taken, by armed 
men in civilian clothes, to a hotel in Skopje. He was held in a room on the top floor of 
the hotel and constantly guarded by an armed team of nine men. He was regularly 
interrogated, in English, and refused his requests to contact the German embassy. Once, 
when he tried to leave a gun was pointed at his head and he was told he would be shot. 
After a week of detention an official offered to return the applicant to Germany if he 
confessed that he was  a member of Al-Qaeda. On the thirteenth day of his detention the 
applicant began a hunger strike as a means of protesting against his confinement. A 
week later he was told he would be returned to Germany. On 23 January 2004, the 
applicant was told to make a video-recorded statement that he had not been harmed 
and that he was being flown back to Germany. He was than handcuffed, blindfolded and 
taken to Skopje airport. 
 At the airport, whilst still handcuffed and blindfolded, he was place on a chair. He 
was then severely beaten and all his clothes were cut from his body. An object was 
inserted into his anus and a suppository was forcibly administered. His blindfold was 
removed and he saw about eight men dressed in black and wearing ski masks. One of 
them placed a nappy on him and he was dressed in a track suit. A bag was placed over 
his head and his legs and arms were chained to a belt around his waist. He was taken to 
an aircraft where he was restrained, in a spread-eagled stance, on the floor of the plane. 
The applicant was given two injections and remained unconscious for most of the flight. 
 On disembarking from the plane the applicant noted that it was warm, and 
therefore not Germany. Subsequently, he concluded that he had been transported to 
Afghanistan (via Baghdad). After a short drive from the airport he was placed in a small 
dirty cell and kicked/beaten. There was no bed in the cell, just a dirty blanket. El-Masri 
later formed the view that he had been held in a USA Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
facility (a former brick factory) in Kabul known as the “Salt Pit”, where high-level 
terrorism suspects were kept for detention and interrogation. During his detention there 
he was interrogated several times by a man speaking Arabic, with a Lebanese accent. 
The interrogations involved threats, insults, pushing and shouting. In March 2004 the 
applicant began another hunger strike. On the thirty-seventh day of his protest he was 
subjected to forced feeding via a nasal tube. This caused him to become seriously ill and 
he was given medication by a doctor. At this time El-Masri felt an earthquake (US 
Geological Survey records disclosed an earthquake on 5 April 2004 in the Hindu-Kush 
region). In May 2004 the applicant was visited several times by a man (“Sam”) who 
spoke German. On 21 May 2004 El-Masri resumed his hunger strike. A week later, he 
was given his suitcase and the remaining clothes that had been taken from him in 
Macedonia. He was taken to an airplane and chained to a seat where Sam told him they 
were returning to a European country. El-Masri was blindfolded and had earmuffs placed 
on his head for the flight. After the plane landed, and still blindfolded, the applicant was 
driven across different types of roads by a group of men speaking with Slavic accents 
(they did not tell El-Masri where he was being taken). He was eventually released on a 
road and told not to look back. He soon encountered three armed officials who took him 
to a building with an Albanian flag and he was told he was in that country. He was 
transported to Tirana and flown back to Frankfurt on 29 May 2004. 
 The Munich public prosecutor began an investigation into the applicant’s 
allegations regarding his treatment in Macedonia and Afghanistan. During 2007 that 
prosecutor issued arrest warrants against thirteen CIA agents in respect of their alleged 
involvement with the applicant’s extraordinary rendition. The Spanish authorities had 
supplied the Munich prosecutor with the names, but they were not identified in public. In 
2009 a Committee of Inquiry, established by the German Bundestag, found most of the 
applicant’s allegations to be credible. In December 2005 the American Civil Liberties 
Union filed a claim, on the applicant’s behalf, against the former Director of the CIA and 
unknown agents with the Virginia District Court. The US government asserted State 
secrets privilege and that defence was accepted by the District and Appeals Courts. The 
US  Supreme Court declined to review the applicant’s case. During 2005 the Macedonian 
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Ministry of the Interior conducted an inquiry into the applicant’s case. El-Masri was not 
asked to provide evidence to the inquiry nor informed of its outcome. The inquiry 
concluded that the applicant had not been held in the Skopje hotel by officials and he 
had voluntary left Macedonia, at the Blace border crossing, on 24 January 2004. In 
October 2008 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a criminal complaint with the Skopje public 
prosecutor against unidentified Macedonian officials concerning El-Masri’s detention in 
Macedonia and subsequent extraordinary rendition. Two months later the prosecutor 
rejected the complaint as unsubstantiated (she did not take oral evidence from the 
applicant, interview the Skopje hotel staff or check relevant aircraft landings/take-offs). 
Thereupon, the applicant began civil proceedings against the Ministry of Interior in the 
Macedonian courts. The litigation was still ongoing before the first instance court at the 
time of the Strasbourg judgment (the Macedonian government claimed that  many 
adjournments had been necessary because of El-Masri’s imprisonment in Germany). 
 The applicant lodged his application at Strasburg in July 2009. The Macedonian 
judge withdrew from the Chamber and the respondent State nominated  the Danish 
judge to replace her. In January 2011 the Chamber relinquished jurisdiction to the Grand 
Chamber. Third-party written comments were received from the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and a number of non-governmental organisations. 
 Before the Grand Chamber the respondent State contended that the application 
should be rejected for failing to be brought within the six-month time limit laid down by 
ECHR Article 35. The Grand Chamber considered that the applicant’s delay (between his 
return to Germany in May 2004 and making his criminal complaint in October 2008) 
could be explained by the nature of the CIA’s secretive extraordinary rendition 
programme with most Council of Europe States denying any participation in these acts. 
Therefore, Macedonia’s objection was dismissed. 
 Turning to the applicant’s allegations the respondent State denied all of them as 
being unsubstantiated. The Grand Chamber reaffirmed its well-established evidential 
standard that disputed facts had to be established beyond reasonable doubt. The 
applicant’s description of his alleged mal-treatment had been detailed and consistent. 
Furthermore, it was supported by  extensive indirect evidence including: aviation logs of 
USA registered civilian jets to Skopje, from there to Kabul and returning to a military 
airfield in Albania on relevant dates; scientific tests of the applicant’s hair when he 
returned to Germany confirming that he had spent time in South Asia and geological 
records of an earthquake during his alleged detention in Kabul. Additionally, Mr H.K. (the 
Macedonian Minister of the Interior during 2004) had produced a sworn written 
statement that the Macedonian authorities  (the State Intelligence Service) had detained 
the applicant in accordance with an international arrest warrant issued by the USA and 
that he had been handed over to the CIA at Skopje airport. The Grand Chamber 
observed that normally the Court treats statements by minister and officials with 
“caution” as they generally tend to favour the position of the State they represent. But, 
where the statement comes from a senior person who played a direct role in the dispute 
and acknowledges facts unfavourable to the authorities then the Court may consider this 
to be a form of admission. The respondent government had failed to provide the Court 
with a plausible explanation of what happened to the applicant once he was detained at 
their border post. Consequently, the Grand Chamber found that the applicant’s 
allegations had been established beyond reasonable doubt. 
 El-Masri contended that his detention and interrogation at the hotel, his “capture 
shock” treatment at Skopje airport and his maltreatment in Afghanistan were the 
responsibility of  Macedonia and violated Article 3 of the Convention. The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights stressed the importance of “the right to the true” 
being provided to victims (and the families) of forced disappearances. This involved, 
inter alia, States conducting effective investigations into forced disappearances and  
providing victims with information about the perpetrators. Both Interights and Amnesty 
International/International Commission of Jurists submitted that this case provided the 
Court with an opportunity to rule on the illegality of the USA’s extraordinary rendition 
programme. Regarding the implied positive obligation, under Article 3, requiring Member 
States to conduct effective investigations into arguable complaints of mal-treatment by 
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officials the Court ruled that the Macedonian prosecutor’s brief enquiry was inadequate. 
She had not queried the Ministry of the Interior’s assertions that the applicant had 
voluntarily stayed in the Skopje hotel and left the country. 
Having regard to the parties’ observations, and especially the submissions of the 
third-party interveners, the Court also wishes to address another aspect of the 
inadequate character of the investigation in the present case, namely its impact on 
the right to the truth regarding the relevant circumstances of the case. In this 
connection it underlines the great importance of the present case not only for the 
applicant and his family, but also for other victims of similar crimes and the general 
public, who had the right to know what had happened. The issue of “extraordinary 
rendition” attracted worldwide attention and triggered inquiries by many 
international and intergovernmental organisations, including the UN human rights 
bodies, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. The latter revealed 
that some of the States concerned were not interested in seeing the truth come 
out.22 
The Macedonian investigation failed to establish the truth of the applicant’s suffering and 
identify those responsible. A breach of the procedural limb of Article 3 had thereby 
occurred.  
 Regarding the extra-judicial detention of the applicant in the Skopje hotel without 
communication to the outside world and the threat of being shot if he tried to leave, that 
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment violating Article 3. The respondent State 
was also responsible under the Convention for the applicant’s  mal-treatment at Skopje 
airport as it occurred in the presence  of Macedonian officials and on its territory. 
Previous jurisprudence had established that persons should not be forcibly undressed  
unless there were compelling justifications and none had been given in respect of the 
applicant. Similarly, the forced administration of a suppository to the applicant was not 
required by any medical necessity. As the above measures were taken with the intention 
of causing the applicant severe pain and suffering to gain information or intimidate him 
they amounted to torture. The Grand Chamber found no evidence that the applicant’s 
transfer to the CIA was in response to a lawful extradition request nor to a valid arrest 
warrant (cf. the written statement of the former Macedonian Minster of the Interior H.K. 
noted above). The Macedonian authorities knew the aircraft was bound for Afghanistan 
and public documents (including English and USA court judgments) constituted “reliable 
sources reporting practices that have been resorted to or tolerated by the US authorities 
and that are manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention.”23 Consequently, 
Macedonia knew/should have known that by subjecting the applicant to extraordinary 
rendition  they were exposing him to a real risk of treatment violating Article 3. His 
transfer to the CIA, by the Macedonia authorities, was another breach of Article 3. 
 El-Masri  also contended that his rights under Article 5 had been infringed. The 
Grand Chamber found that no Macedonian court had ordered the applicant’s detention. 
In the judgment of the Grand Chamber it was: 
…wholly unacceptable that in a State subject to the rule of law a person could be 
deprived of his or her liberty in an extraordinary place of detention outside any 
judicial framework, as was the hotel in the present case. It considers that his 
detention in such a highly unusual location adds to the arbitrariness of the 
deprivation. 
…the Court reiterates that Article 5 of the Convention lays down an obligation on 
the State not only to refrain from active infringements of the rights in question, but 
also to take appropriate steps to provide protection against an unlawful 
interference with those rights to everyone within its jurisdiction (see Storck 
v. Germany, no. 61603/00, §§ 100-101, ECHR 2005-V, and Medova v. Russia, 
no. 25385/04, § 123, 15 January 2009). The Macedonian authorities not only failed 
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to comply with their positive obligation to protect the applicant from being detained 
in contravention of Article 5 of the Convention, but they actively facilitated his 
subsequent detention in Afghanistan by handing him over to the CIA, despite the 
fact that they were aware or ought to have been aware of the risk of that transfer. 
The Court considers therefore that the responsibility of the respondent State is also 
engaged in respect of the applicant’s detention between 23 January and 28 May 
2004…24 
The applicant’s abduction and detention in violation of Article 5 constituted an “enforced 
disappearance” for which Macedonia was responsible throughout his detention in that 
country and subsequently in Afghanistan.  
 The Grand Chamber went on to find that El-Masri’s rights to respect for his 
private and family life, guaranteed by ECHR Article 8 and his Article 13 right to an 
effective domestic remedy to resolve breaches of Convention rights  had also been 
breached by Macedonia. 
 The applicant sought 300,000 euros just satisfaction in regard to his non-
pecuniary damage (for the suffering, including a mental breakdown, inflicted on him). He 
based this claim on damages awarded in Swedish, Canadian and UK litigation involving 
analogous complaints. The respondent State challenged his compensation claim 
(re)arguing that he had not been subject to extraordinary rendition. Noting the “extreme 
seriousness of the violations of the Convention of which the applicant was a victim”25  
the Grand Chamber awarded him 60,000 euros compensation. 
 This was a momentous judgment with global implications as the Strasbourg Court 
unequivocally found that a Member State’s collaboration with the USA’s covert 
extraordinary rendition programme violated a number of the most fundamental rights in 
the ECHR, including the prohibition of torture and the right to liberty. Crucially, a 
Member State that knowingly transfers a person from its jurisdiction to the USA’s 
extraordinary rendition programme will remain liable under the ECHR for that person’s  
detention by the Americans.  The Strasbourg Court should be commended for robustly 
applying the Convention despite the respondent State’s denials of responsibility. Indeed, 
the credibility and veracity of the Macedonian authorities has been seriously undermined 
by the Court’s findings in El-Masri. From a comparative law perspective the Strasbourg 
Court’s willingness to determine the merits of the applicant’s complaints casts the US 
Supreme Court’s refusal to consider El-Masri’s civil action in a very poor light regarding 
the protection of basic human rights. More generally, the President of the Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly praised the Court; “[t]his judgment can be called 
historic: it is the first condemnation, by an international court, of the CIA practice of 
renditions and secret detentions, which the Court has likened to enforced disappearance 
and cruel and inhuman treatment.”26  The judgment also provided judicial recognition 
and re-enforcement for the dogged investigations and condemnation of several Member 
States collaboration with the CIA’s extraordinary rendition operations undertaken by the 
Parliamentary Assembly’s special rapporteur Dick Marty.27 
  
  
 
ARTICLE 5:ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC PROTECTION SENTENCES 
                                                          
24
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A Chamber found systematic failings in the implementation of Indeterminate Public 
Protection (IPP) sentences by the prison authorities in the joined case of James, Wells 
and Lee v United Kingdom28. This category of sentence was created by the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 and where a defendant was convicted of a specified (“serious”) offence 
and that person had previously been convicted of another “relevant offence” the trial 
judge was required to impose an IPP sentence. The trial judge imposed a specified 
period of imprisonment as the “tariff” to punish the convicted defendant, but the latter 
could not be released from imprisonment under the IPP sentence until the Parole Board 
considered that the prisoner was no longer a danger to society and ordered his/her 
release. Soon after the introduction of IPP sentences it became apparent that a large 
number of convicted defendants fell within the above provisions and were accordingly 
being given IPP sentences. Many IPP prisoners, like the three applicants, had relatively 
short fixed tariffs, but the prison system did not have the resources to manage all the 
IPP prisoners being held. In order to gain release, after serving his/her tariff, an IPP 
prisoner had to successfully complete relevant courses, such as “Alcohol Free Good Life”, 
to be able to convince the Parole Board that they no longer posed a threat to the public. 
But only a limited number of (“lifer”) prisons had the resources to offer these courses 
and many IPP prisoners had to wait a long time to gain access to these courses. In 
regard to the applicants: 
Mr James’ tariff expired almost one year and 295 days after he was sentenced. He 
was not progressed through the prison system during that period and 
recommended courses were unavailable to him. He was not transferred to a first 
stage lifer prison until five months after his tariff had expired. He was released 
three months later. Mr Wells’ tariff expired 307 days after he was sentenced. He 
was also not progressed through the prison system during that period and 
recommended courses remained unavailable to him. He was not transferred to a 
first stage lifer prison until twenty-one months after his tariff had expired. 
Thereafter he was given access to relevant courses and completed three such 
courses over a period of approximately eight months. Mr Lee’s tariff expired 163 
days after he was sentenced. Like Mr James and Mr Wells, he was not progressed 
through the prison system during that period and recommended courses remained 
unavailable to him. He was not transferred to a first stage lifer prison until twenty-
five months after his tariff had expired. Although assessments for the course 
recommended for him then commenced, a further five-month period of delay 
occurred following a recommendation for prior motivational work which was not 
available to him.29 
The applicants brought separate judicial review proceedings against the Secretary of 
State responsible for the prison system. The domestic courts found that the Secretary 
had breached his public law duties in failing to provide adequate courses for IPP 
prisoners. However, the House of Lords rejected the applicants’ contention that their 
rights under ECHR Article 5 had been violated. 
 At Strasbourg the applicants’ claimed, inter alia, that the prison authorities’ 
delays in permitting them access to relevant courses, once they had completed their 
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tariff periods of imprisonment, resulted in their continued detention being arbitrary and a 
violation of Article 5(1). The government responded that the Secretary of State’s failure 
to provide sufficient rehabilitative courses for all IPP prisoners did not result in the 
continued detention of IPP prisoners, post-tariff, breaching Article 5(1). Following well-
established jurisprudence the Chamber re-affirmed that preventive detention ordered by 
a sentencing court fell within the exception to the right to liberty elaborated in Article 
5(1)(a). However, it was necessary to determine if the applicants’ post-tariff detention 
was arbitrary. Noting Council of Europe and United Nations guidelines on the desirability 
of rehabilitation programmes for prisoners the Chamber determined that: 
…in cases concerning indeterminate sentences of imprisonment for the protection 
of the public, a real opportunity for rehabilitation is a necessary element of any 
part of the detention which is to be justified solely by reference to public 
protection. In the case of the IPP sentence, it is in any event clear that the 
legislation was premised on the understanding that rehabilitative treatment would 
be made available to those prisoners on whom an IPP sentence was imposed, even 
if this was not an express objective of the legislation itself. Indeed, this premise 
formed the basis upon which a breach of the Secretary of State’s public law duty 
was found…30 
The Chamber accepted that there was no bad faith in the respondent government’s 
introduction or administration of the IPP sentence. Furthermore, the IPP scheme had 
been subject to major legislative amendments in 2008, making it a discretionary 
sentence which would normally only be imposed by a sentencing judge when the 
convicted defendant had been given a tariff of more than two years’ imprisonment. But, 
those reforms did not help the applicants. 
The Court considers it significant that substantial periods of time passed in respect 
of each of the applicants before they even began to make any progress in their 
sentences… It is clear that the delays were the result of a lack of resources and 
while, as noted above, resource implications are relevant, it is nonetheless 
significant that the inadequate resources at issue in the present case appeared to 
be the consequence of the introduction of draconian measures for indeterminate 
detention without the necessary planning and without realistic consideration of the 
impact of the measures. Further, the length of the delays in the applicants’ cases 
was considerable: for around two and a half years, they were simply left in local 
prisons where there were few, if any, offending behaviour programmes. As Laws LJ 
indicated, the stark consequence of the failure to make available the necessary 
resources was that the applicants had no realistic chance of making objective 
progress towards a real reduction or elimination of the risk they posed by the time 
their tariff periods expired... Further, once the applicants’ tariffs had expired, their 
detention was justified solely on the grounds of the risk they posed to the public 
and the need for access to rehabilitative treatment at that stage became all the 
more pressing. 
221. In these circumstances, the Court considers that following the expiry of the 
applicants’ tariff periods and until steps were taken to progress them through the 
prison system with a view to providing them with access to appropriate 
rehabilitative courses, their detention was arbitrary and therefore unlawful within 
the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Although in the cases of Mr James 
and Mr Wells the Court is satisfied that following their transfer there is no evidence 
of any unreasonable delay in providing them with access to courses, it notes that a 
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further five-month delay was encountered by Mr Lee following the recommendation 
in December 2008 for prior motivational work. The Court considers it significant 
that by December 2008 Mr Lee was already two years and ten months post-tariff, 
in the context of a nine-month tariff. It was accordingly imperative that his 
treatment be progressed as a matter of urgency and in the absence of any 
explanation from the Government for the delay, the Court concludes that this 
period of detention was also arbitrary and therefore unlawful within the meaning of 
Article 5 § 1. 
222. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in 
the case of all three applicants. 
The applicants were awarded 3,000, 6,200 and 8,000 euros as compensation for non-
pecuniary damage. 
 The judgment is a strong endorsement of the need for governments to provide 
adequate resources to fund rehabilitation programmes for prisoners. Clearly, the 
implementation of the  IPP sentence had not been properly planned and when the 
inadequacy of places on remedial courses quickly became apparent the authorities failed 
to resolve the problem for several years. It is now clear that if governments introduce 
schemes imposing potentially lengthy periods of protective imprisonment on convicted 
defendants the authorities must also establish programmes which enable those prisoners 
to demonstrate that their danger to society has been ameliorated. If such prisoners are 
denied adequate access to suitable courses then Article 5 will be breached. 
 
 
ARTICLE 8: THE APPLICATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS 
In Nada v Switzerland31, the Grand Chamber scrutinised the application of anti-terrorism 
sanctions, authorised by the United Nations’ Security Council (hereafter the SC), by a 
Member State in accordance with the latter’s obligations under the ECHR. This important 
judgment has similarities with the earlier ruling of the (then) Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (Luxembourg Court) in the well-known Kadi case32 in which the 
Luxembourg Court determined that EC  regulations adopted to implement the same SC 
resolutions violated the applicants’  fundamental property rights. Nada is an Italian and 
Egyptian national who has lived in Campione d’Italia, a 1.6 sq. km Italian enclave 
surrounded by Swiss territory, since 1970. He is in his eighties and owns a number of 
businesses in the field of banking and foreign trade. During October 1999 the SC 
adopted Resolution 1267 (1999), under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to impose 
sanctions on the Taliban. This was a response to bombings of USA embassies by 
associates of  Osama bin Laden. The Resolution established a Sanctions Committee, 
comprising the members of the SC, to monitor the enforcement of the sanctions. A year 
later the Swiss federal government issued an Ordinance (the Taliban Ordinance) 
implementing the SC sanctions. At the end of 2000 the SC expanded the sanctions to 
apply to Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and senior Taliban officials. The Sanctions 
Committee was to maintain a list of persons connected to these organisations, with 
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States supplying relevant names. In April 2001 the Swiss Taliban Ordinance was 
amended to take account of the changes to the SC sanctions system and persons on the 
list maintained by the Sanctions Committee were prohibited from entering or transiting 
through Switzerland. The Swiss Federal Prosecutor began an investigation into Nada in 
October of that year. A couple of weeks later the President of the USA ordered the 
blocking of assets of a bank in which Nada was the principal shareholder and chairman. 
Two days later Nada, and a number of organisations connected with him, were added to 
the list maintained by the Sanctions Committee (during the later Strasbourg proceedings 
the Swiss government confirmed that it was the USA that had sought Nada’s addition to 
the list). Switzerland joined the UN in September 2002. Two months later when Nada 
visited London he was arrested and deported to Italy and his money seized. In October 
2003, following criticisms from the SC monitors, the Canton of Ticino revoked Nada’s 
special border-crossing permit that enabled him to transit across Swiss territory to and 
from Campione d’Italia and the rest of Italy. During 2004 the Swiss federal authorities 
refused Nada’s requests to transit through Swiss territory for medical treatment and 
legal proceedings. However, in May 2005 the Swiss Federal Prosecutor closed the 
investigation into Nada, finding the accusations against him were unsubstantiated. Nada 
subsequently requested the Swiss federal government to delete his name from the 
Taliban Ordinance, but that was refused as the government asserted only the Sanctions 
Committee could amend the list of designated persons/organisations. In 2007 the SC 
body dealing with representations for delisting rejected Nada’s request, refused to inform 
him which State had requested his listing or provide the reasons for his listing. At around 
the same time the Swiss Federal Court rejected Nada’s challenges to the application of 
the Taliban Ordinance to him by the Swiss authorities. The Italian government requested 
the Sanctions Committee to delist Nada, in July 2008, but that request was denied. He 
was permitted to enter Switzerland for two days in September of that year. In July 2009 
the USA requested Nada’s delisting by the Sanctions Committee. The following month he 
made a similar request and in September 2009 Switzerland notified the Sanctions 
Committee that the Federal Prosecutor had found no evidence linking Nada with other 
persons or organisations on the list. On 23 September 2009 Nada’s name was removed 
from the SC sanctions list and in early October 2009 the Swiss Taliban Ordinance was 
amended accordingly. 
 Nada applied  to the Court in February 2008 complaining, inter alia, that the ban 
on him entering or transiting through Switzerland, as a consequence of the application of 
the Taliban Ordinance, violated his right to respect for private and family life, honour and 
reputation guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR. The governments of France and the UK 
made written comments to the Chamber, but the Italian government did not intervene. 
Subsequently, the Chamber relinquished jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber. The non-
governmental organisation JUSTICE was given permission to submit written comments 
to the latter body and the UK government made oral submissions during the hearing 
before the Grand Chamber. 
 The Swiss government, supported by France and the UK, contended that the 
application was inadmissible ratione personae as the actions of the Swiss authorities 
were mandated by SC Resolutions that prevailed over the other international legal 
obligations of Member States. JUSTICE argued that these Resolutions generated 
“draconian restrictions” on Convention rights, including Article 8, and the UN system did 
not provide equivalent measures of protection. The Grand Chamber, unanimously, 
dismissed the States’ claim of inadmissibility. According to the Grand Chamber the SC 
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Resolutions obliged States to take action themselves at the national level to implement 
the prescribed sanctions. Therefore, the travel restrictions imposed on the applicant by 
the Swiss Taliban Ordinance fell within the jurisdiction of that State for the purposes of 
the Convention. 
 Regarding the applicant’s complaints under Article 8, he submitted that the Swiss 
travel restrictions had infringed respect for his private and family life by preventing him 
from participating in family events such as weddings and funerals. Additionally, his 
designation under the Taliban Ordinance had caused damage to his honour and 
reputation by associating him with suspected supporters of terrorism. The Swiss 
government responded that the applicant had not been subject to any restrictions on 
who could visit him at his home. Furthermore, if he wished to travel across Swiss 
territory in order to attend family events he could have sought an exemption from the 
sanctions. The Grand Chamber determined that the travel restrictions imposed on the 
applicant for at least six years amounted to an interference with his right to private and 
family life. The applicant did not dispute the legal basis for the restrictions (the Taliban 
Ordinance) nor that they had a legitimate aim under Article 8(2), to prevent crime and 
protect national security. Therefore, the disputed issue was whether the restrictions were 
“necessary in a democratic society”. The Swiss, French and British governments were 
united in submitted that States had no latitude in implementing these SC Resolutions. 
But the Grand Chamber concluded “that Switzerland enjoyed some latitude, which was 
admittedly limited but nevertheless real, in implementing the relevant binding 
Resolutions”.33 This was based, inter alia, on the Resolutions permitting transit of a 
designated person where necessary for a judicial process. The Grand Chamber expressed 
its surprise that Switzerland had failed to notify the Sanctions Committee for four years 
that its Federal Prosecutor had closed the investigation into the applicant. Also, the 
effects of the travel restrictions were to prevent the applicant from leaving the enclave of 
Campione d’Italia. 
…the Court considers in particular that the Swiss authorities did not sufficiently 
take into account the realities of the case, especially the unique geographical 
situation of Campione d’Italia, the considerable duration of the measures imposed 
or the applicant’s nationality, age and health.34 
Given the “special character” of the ECHR as a treaty establishing a system of collective 
enforcement of fundamental rights, the Grand Chamber held that: 
…the respondent State could not validly confine itself to relying on the binding 
nature of Security Council resolutions, but should have persuaded the Court that it 
had taken- or at least had attempted to take- all possible measures to adapt the 
sanctions regime to the applicant’s individual circumstances.35 
Therefore, the Grand Chamber considered that it was dispensed from having to rule on 
the hierarchy of obligations of Member States under the ECHR and the UN Charter. 
Overall, the Grand Chamber, unanimously, concluded that Switzerland had not achieved 
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a fair balance between the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life and 
the State’s legitimate aims of preventing crime and safeguarding national security. 
Hence the applicant had suffered a violation of Article 8. The Grand Chamber did not 
consider it necessary to determine the applicant’s complaint in respect of the alleged 
damage to his honour and reputation. He did not seek any damages. 
 President Bratza with Judges Nicolaou and Yudkivska issued a concurring opinion 
in which they disagreed with the Grand Chamber’s judgment that Switzerland possessed 
some latitude when implementing the SC Resolutions. Judge Rozakis joined by Judges 
Spielmann and Berro-Lefevre also issued a separate concurring opinion. They believed 
the Grand Chamber should have determined the applicant’s complaint about his honour 
and  reputation as an integral element of his invocation of Article 8. The Grand 
Chamber’s “side-stepping” of this aspect of his complaint gave the impression that 
honour and reputation were not central elements of a person’s private life. Judge 
Malinverni produced his own concurring opinion in which he too disagreed with the Grand 
Chamber’s view that the SC Resolutions accorded Switzerland discretion to apply the 
specified sanctions. In addition he was critical of the Grand Chamber for not addressing 
the underlying issue of the conflict between international law norms. 
 The judgment in Nada constitutes  another significant international judicial 
determination that the implementation of UN SC anti-terrorism sanctions have infringed 
the basic human rights of specific persons. Certainly the highly unusual territorial 
location of the applicant’s long-established home greatly exacerbated the negative 
effects of the UN travel restrictions he was subjected to. But, Switzerland’s failure to 
inform the UN Sanctions Committee for over four years that it had found no links 
between the applicant and any of the other persons/organisations specified by the SC 
may have contributed to the undue prolongation of those restriction on him. There is 
also substance to Judge Malinverni’s criticism that the Grand Chamber failed to be 
sufficiently bold and directly address the issue of a conflict between Member States 
obligations under the ECHR and the UN Charter/SC resolutions. However, at least the 
Grand Chamber ruled that Member States must “as far as possible”36 seek to harmonise 
those obligations if they are divergent. Furthermore, where Convention rights are 
involved Member States must have regard to the personal circumstances of individuals 
when applying UN sanctions to them. 
 
Article 9: FREEDOM TO MANIFEST A RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
Four applicants claimed that their right to manifest their, Christian faith, had been 
breached in Eweida and others v United Kingdom37. Nadia Eweida is a practising Coptic 
Christian who worked as a member of the check-in staff of British Airways plc at 
Heathrow airport from 1999. In 2004 a new uniform for those staff was introduced 
together with a “wearer guide”. The latter document provided that any accessory or 
clothing required for mandatory religious reasons was to be covered up by the uniform. 
The company permitted, inter alia, Sikh male employees to wear dark blue or white 
turbans and female Muslim staff to wear hijabs in company approved colours. Until May 
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2006 Eweida wore a cross on a chain , as a symbol of her commitment to her faith, 
concealed under her uniform. Then she started wearing it openly. After various 
exchanges with management she was sent home, without pay, on 20 September 2006 
as she refused to cover up her cross. A month later she was offered administrative work, 
without customer contact, where no uniform restrictions applied, but she refused the 
offer. In January 2007, following consultations with staff and their trade unions, British 
Airways announced a change to its uniform policy. Visible displays of permitted religious 
and charity symbols by staff would be allowed. The cross and star of David were 
immediately permitted. Eweida returned to work, openly wearing her cross, at the 
beginning of February 2007. She unsuccessfully brought discrimination claims against 
British Airways with the Court of Appeal ultimately rejecting her complaints. 
Shirley Chaplin is a practising Christian who has worn a cross on a chain around 
her neck since her confirmation in 1971. From 1989 to 2010 she worked as a nurse in an 
NHS hospital, where she had an exemplary employment record. Her hospital had a 
uniform policy, based on national guidance, that prohibited necklaces being worn (to 
reduce the risk of injury when handling patients: who might grab hold of the necklace). 
Managers had the power to permit jewellery/clothing for  religious/cultural reasons. In 
2007 a new uniform was introduced at the hospital which included a V-neck tunic for 
nurses. In 2009 Chaplin’s manager required her to stop wearing her neck chain/cross for 
health and safety reasons. A compromise could not be agreed between Chaplin and 
management and the former was moved to a temporary non-nursing position, which 
ended a few months later. Chaplin also brought unsuccessful discrimination proceedings 
against her employer. 
Lilian Ladele, a Christian who believes that same-sex civil partnerships are 
against God’s law, had been employed by Islington Council since 1992. Ten years later 
she became a registrar of births, deaths and marriages. In 2005 legislation came into 
effect providing for the registration of same-sex civil partnerships. Islington Council 
required all its existing registrars to undertake the role of civil partnership registrars 
(some other councils permitted registrars with sincere religious objections to be exempt 
from undertaking such a role). Following complaints (of victimisation) from homosexual 
colleagues against Ladele’s  refusal to undertake the role of civil partnership registrar 
she was subject to disciplinary proceedings by the Council. Her claims against the 
Council were ultimately rejected by the Court of Appeal. 
Gary McFarlane is a practising Christian who believes that the Bible states  that 
homosexual activity is sinful. He worked as a counsellor for Relate, a private organisation 
providing sex therapy and relationship counselling, from 2003 until his dismissal in 2008. 
From 2007 concerns grew in the organisation  that McFarlane was unwilling to work  on 
sexual issues with homosexual couples. The professional Code of Ethics, which Relate 
counsellors had to observe, included an obligation to avoid discrimination on grounds 
including sexual orientation. Following various meetings with superiors McFarlane was 
eventually dismissed for gross misconduct as Relate’s General Manager concluded that 
he had no intention of providing sexual counselling to homosexual couples. McFarlane 
also lost his claims for unfair dismissal and discrimination. 
 Twelve third-parties submitted written comments to the Court. They included 
three Bishops from the UK who contended that the wearing of the cross was the 
manifestation of a religious belief and the ILGA- Europe, together with several other 
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third-parties, who noted that exceptions to discriminations laws were mainly given to 
religious organisations (rather than to individuals). 
 The Chamber found that Eweida’s insistence on wearing the cross was a 
manifestation of her religious belief and therefore fell within the protection of Article 9. 
As the interference with that right had been caused by the actions of a business the 
issue was whether the respondent State had failed to comply with its positive obligation 
to safeguard the applicant’s right. The key factor was had a fair balance been achieved 
between her right and those of the company? 
On one side of the scales was Ms Eweida’s desire to manifest her religious belief. 
As previously noted, this is a fundamental right: because a healthy democratic 
society needs to tolerate and sustain pluralism and diversity; but also because of 
the value to an individual who has made religion a central tenet of his or her life to 
be able to communicate that belief to others. On the other side of the scales was 
the employer’s wish to project a certain corporate image. The Court considers that, 
while this aim was undoubtedly legitimate, the domestic courts accorded it too 
much weight. Ms Eweida’s cross was discreet and cannot have detracted from her 
professional appearance. There was no evidence that the wearing of other, 
previously authorised, items of religious clothing, such as turbans and hijabs, by 
other employees, had any negative impact on British Airways’ brand or image. 
Moreover, the fact that the company was able to amend the uniform code to allow 
for the visible wearing of religious symbolic jewellery demonstrates that the earlier 
prohibition was not of crucial importance. 
95. The Court therefore concludes that, in these circumstances where there is no 
evidence of any real encroachment on the interests of others, the domestic 
authorities failed sufficiently to protect the first applicant’s right to manifest her 
religion, in breach of the positive obligation under Article 9. In the light of this 
conclusion, it does not consider it necessary to examine separately the applicant’s 
complaint under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9.38 
Judges Bratza and Thor Bjorgvinsson dissented as they considered that the domestic 
judiciary had carried out a fair balancing exercise when determining Eweida’s litigation. 
 The Chamber was unanimous in finding no violation of Article 9 or that Article in 
combination with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) concerning Chaplin. As she 
had been employed by a public authority the Court was required to determine if the 
interference with her right to manifest her religious beliefs was a proportionate measure 
to secure one of the aims identified in Article 9(2). In the judgment of the Chamber: 
…the reason for asking her to remove the cross, namely the protection of health 
and safety on a hospital ward, was inherently of a greater magnitude than that 
which applied in respect of Ms Eweida. Moreover, this is a field where the domestic 
authorities must be allowed a wide margin of appreciation. The hospital managers 
were better placed to make decisions about clinical safety than a court, particularly 
an international court which has heard no direct evidence. 
100. It follows that the Court is unable to conclude that the measures of which Ms 
Chaplin complains were disproportionate. It follows that the interference with her 
freedom to manifest her religion was necessary in a democratic society and that 
there was no violation of Article 9 in respect of the second applicant. 
101. Moreover, it considers that the factors to be weighed in the balance when 
assessing the proportionality of the measure under Article 14 taken in conjunction 
with Article 9 would be similar, and that there is no basis on which it can find a 
violation of Article 14 either in this case.39 
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 Ladele focussed her complaint on the contention that she had suffered a violation 
of Article 14 in association with Article 9 on the grounds of religious discrimination. 
However, the majority of the Chamber noted that her local authority employer had 
sought to ensure that all its employees did not discriminate against others. Furthermore, 
the Court’s case-law demanded very serious grounds to justify differences of treatment 
of persons due to their sexual orientation and that same-sex couples needed legal 
protection of their relationships. Additionally, the established jurisprudence generally 
permitted States a wide margin of appreciation to balance competing rights under the 
ECHR. Consequently five judges rejected her complaint. Judges Vucinic and De Gaetano 
issued an extremely strongly worded partly dissenting opinion. They viewed her 
treatment thus: 
In the third applicant’s case, however, a combination of back-stabbing by her 
colleagues and the blinkered political correctness of the Borough of Islington 
(which clearly favoured “gay rights” over fundamental human rights) eventually led 
to her dismissal.  … 
Given the cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance of her conscientious 
objection (which, as noted earlier, was also a manifestation of her deep religious 
convictions) it was incumbent upon the local authority to treat her differently from 
those registrars who had no conscientious objection to officiating at same-sex 
unions – something which clearly could have been achieved without detriment to 
the overall services provided by the Borough including those services provided by 
registrars, as evidenced by the experience of other local authorities. Instead of 
practising the tolerance and the “dignity for all” it preached, the Borough of 
Islington pursued the doctrinaire line, the road of obsessive political correctness. It 
effectively sought to force the applicant to act against her conscience or face the 
extreme penalty of dismissal – something which, even assuming that the 
limitations of Article 9 § 2 apply to prescriptions of conscience, cannot be deemed 
necessary in a democratic society. Ms Ladele did not fail in her duty of discretion: 
she did not publicly express her beliefs to service users. Her beliefs had no impact 
on the content of her job, but only on its extent. She never attempted to impose 
her beliefs on others, nor was she in any way engaged, openly or surreptitiously, in 
subverting the rights of others. Thus, even if one were to undertake the 
proportionality exercise referred to in [the judgment of the majority]with reference 
to whatever legitimate aim the Borough had in view, it follows that the means used 
were totally disproportionate.40 
 Regarding McFarlane the Chamber was united in deciding that, as with Eweida, 
his complaints should be assessed in terms of the State’s positive obligations due to the 
fact that he had been employed by a private sector company.  The Chamber also ruled 
that the Court would not follow the approach utilised by the former Commission that the 
possibility of an employee resigning and seeking alternative employment, when faced 
with restrictions on his/her religious practice by the current employer, was a means of 
finding no interference with the employee’s Article 9 rights. 
Given the importance in a democratic society of freedom of religion, the Court 
considers that, where an individual complains of a restriction on freedom of religion 
in the workplace, rather than holding that the possibility of changing job would 
negate any interference with the right, the better approach would be to weigh that 
possibility in the overall balance when considering whether or not the restriction 
was proportionate.41 
Applying the new approach the Chamber held that: 
While the Court does not consider that an individual’s decision to enter into a 
contract of employment and to undertake responsibilities which he knows will have 
an impact on his freedom to manifest his religious belief is determinative of the 
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question whether or not there been an interference with Article 9 rights, this is a 
matter to be weighed in the balance when assessing whether a fair balance was 
struck (see paragraph 83 above). However, for the Court the most important factor 
to be taken into account is that the employer’s action was intended to secure the 
implementation of its policy of providing a service without discrimination. The State 
authorities therefore benefitted from a wide margin of appreciation in deciding 
where to strike the balance between Mr McFarlane’s right to manifest his religious 
belief and the employer’s interest in securing the rights of others. In all the 
circumstances, the Court does not consider that this margin of appreciation was 
exceeded in the present case. 
110. In conclusion, the Court does not consider that the refusal by the domestic 
courts to uphold Mr McFarlane’s complaints gave rise to a violation of Article 9, 
taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.42 
The Chamber went on to award Eweida 2,000 euros compensation for non-pecuniary 
damage, but rejected her claim for pecuniary damage in respect of her loss of earnings. 
The judgment observed that she had been offered back-office work, at the same rate of 
pay, by British Airways and whilst she had not been working for the company she had 
received donations exceeding double her lost pay. 
 The Court’s judgment in the above applications received considerable attention in 
the British media, with most coverage being given to Eweida’s victory. From a legal 
perspective the judgment disclosed  that the Court would apply a fair balance test when 
assessing if the domestic authorities had adequately weighed the competing interests of 
employees asserting Article 9 rights against employers relying on other Convention 
rights. Furthermore, the national authorities were accorded a wide margin of 
appreciation by the Court when determining if a fair balance had been achieved. By the 
use of these legal devices the Court was able to avoid making any specific 
pronouncements on how clashes between Article 9 religious belief rights and the 
prohibition of discrimination on sexual orientation grounds under Article 14 combined 
with other substantive Convention rights should be resolved. Nevertheless, the judgment 
did enhance the protection given to employees  wishing to manifest beliefs falling within 
the scope of that Article (encompassing both religious and secular values), as the Court 
ruled that the relevant State could not simply claim that Article 9 was satisfied by the 
ability of the employee to resign and seek alternative employment where he/she would 
have greater freedom to manifest his/her beliefs. Now domestic law must ensure that 
employers only place proportionate restrictions on employees’ right to manifest their 
protected beliefs. 
 
 
Article 10: SAFEGUARDING PLURALISM IN TELEVISION BROADCASTING 
The Grand Chamber judgment in Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v Italy43, had as 
its backdrop the dominant influence (former) Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi exercised 
over television broadcasting in Italy. He was the controlling shareholder in the Mediaset 
group of companies, which owned roughly half of the national tv networks in Italy. 
Furthermore, as Prime Minister he had been, according to a Resolution of the Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, “…in a position to influence indirectly the public 
broadcasting organisation, RAI, which is Mediaset’s main competitor.”44 In combination 
Mediaset and RAI’s broadcasts attracted 90% of the tv audience in Italy. The applicant 
company (hereafter Centro) successfully obtained a licence from the Italian authorities, 
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in 1999, to  operate a nationwide analogue tv network (covering 80% of the national 
territory on three frequencies). The licence provided that the frequencies would be 
allocated in accordance with the national frequency allocation plan and Centro should 
ensure that its broadcasting installations were compatible with the plan within twenty-
four months. However, Centro was not allocated any frequencies and several Laws 
passed by the Italian Parliament authorised existing tv broadcasters (known as “over-
quota channels” as they infringed media concentration limits set in 1997 by the Italian 
authorities) to continue broadcasting. 
Centro began administrative law proceedings against the Ministry of  Communications 
and RTI (a Mediaset tv network) which resulted in judgments in the company’s favour 
from the Lazio Regional Court and the Consiglio di Stato. In 2009 the company was able 
to start broadcasting on one frequency. But the company did not consider that satisfied 
the terms of its licence and it resumed its legal action (which was still pending when the 
Grand Chamber delivered its judgment). A second set of administrative law proceedings 
were also initiated by Centro, in 2003, seeking compensation. They led to the Consiglio 
di Stato seeking a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on the application of EU law and 
Article 10 of the ECHR to the Italian legislation governing broadcasting. The CJEU ruled 
that freedom to provide services under EU law required not only the granting of 
broadcasting authorisations but also the provision of frequencies to those who had 
received the former. The CJEU determined that it need not rule on the application of 
Article 10 of the ECHR in the context of EU law. Subsequently, the Consiglio di Stato held 
that it could not allocate tv frequencies, but ordered the government to deal with 
Centro’s request for frequencies in accordance with the ruling of the CJEU. Centro 
submitted an expert valuation assessing its loss of profits at 2.175 billion euros (this was 
based on the profits  generated by the Mediaset over quota tv channel that should have 
surrendered its frequencies to Centro). The Cosiglio di Stato refused to take into account 
the expert valuation and awarded Centro just over 1 million euros compensation. 
 Centro and its statutory representative, the second applicant, lodged an 
application with the Court in 2009. A Chamber subsequently relinquished jurisdiction, 
under Article 30 of the ECHR, to the Grand Chamber. The government’s contention that 
the second applicant lacked standing was accepted by the Grand Chamber, as it was 
Centro that had been granted the licence and brought the domestic legal proceedings. 
Regarding Article 10 of the ECHR Centro argued that it had suffered a violation of its 
freedom to impart information and ideas as no broadcasting frequencies had been 
allocated to it by the Italian authorities for nearly a decade. Open Society Justice 
Initiative, part of the Soros Foundation network, in its third-party comments submitted 
that Centro’s complaint should be assessed in the context of the “malaise” in Italian 
broadcasting and that the Court should consider requiring systemic measures to be 
taken to guarantee pluralism in Italian broadcasting if the Article 10 complaint was 
upheld. The government responded  that Centro had not been allocated broadcasting 
frequencies due to the reorganisation of national and local frequencies in a situation 
where there were limited frequencies and existing broadcasters had successfully 
appealed to the domestic courts. Implicitly the government also sought to downplay the 
importance of the applicant company’s broadcasts noting that they included “horror films 
and adult films”. 
 The Grand Chamber observed that its previous case-law had established a 
number of relevant principles including the following: 
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…to ensure true pluralism in the audiovisual sector in a democratic society, it is not 
sufficient to provide for the existence of several channels or the theoretical 
possibility for potential operators to access the audiovisual market. It is necessary 
in addition to allow effective access to the market so as to guarantee diversity of 
overall programme content, reflecting as far as possible the variety of opinions 
encountered in the society at which the programmes are aimed. 
. . . 
A situation whereby a powerful economic or political group in society is permitted 
to obtain a position of dominance over the audiovisual media and thereby exercise 
pressure on broadcasters and eventually curtail their editorial freedom undermines 
the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic society as enshrined 
in Article 10 of the Convention, in particular where it serves to impart information 
and ideas of general interest, which the public is moreover entitled to receive… 
The Court observes that in such a sensitive sector as the audiovisual media, in 
addition to its negative duty of non-interference the State has a positive obligation 
to put in place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework to 
guarantee effective pluralism (see paragraph 130 above). This is especially 
desirable when, as in the present case, the national audiovisual system is 
characterised by a duopoly.45 
 
However, Cento’s complaint differed from earlier applications as it had been granted a 
licence to broadcast. But, the Grand Chamber noted that as the authorities had failed to 
allocate any frequencies to the company for nearly a decade the licence had been of no 
practical use for that period of time. Hence Centro had suffered an interference with the 
exercise of its right to impart information and ideas.  
 The next issue for the Grand Chamber was whether the government could justify 
interfering with Centro’s freedom of expression under Article 10(2). Such interferences 
have to be “prescribed by law” and the Grand Chamber, taking account of the CJEU’s 
critical comments regarding the Italian broadcasting legislation delivered in its 
preliminary ruling, determined that relevant domestic law lacked adequate clarity and 
precision. Consequently, Centro was deprived: 
 
…of the measure of protection against arbitrariness required by the rule of law in a 
democratic society. This shortcoming resulted, among other things, in reduced 
competition in the audiovisual sector. It therefore amounted to a failure by the 
State to comply with its positive obligation to put in place an appropriate legislative 
and administrative framework to guarantee effective media pluralism.46 
 
Centro’s complaint of a breach of Article 10 was upheld by all the Judges except Judge 
Steiner, as she considered that the company had not lodged its application within the 
six-month time limit specified by Article 35(1) of the ECHR. 
 Centro also alleged that that it had been a victim of discriminatory treatment, 
compared to Mediaset, in the exercise of its right to freedom of expression (breach of 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 10 of the Convention). Fascinatingly, the 
government contended that “a political approach” should not be adopted in respect of 
this complaint, and there was no connection between the circumstances of Centro and 
Mediaset. The Grand Chamber, unanimously, held that it was not necessary to examine 
this complaint having regard to the earlier finding of a breach of Article 10. A large 
majority (14 votes to 3) of the Grand Chamber went on to find a breach of Centro’s right 
to the peaceful enjoyment of its property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR). 
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 The final, and most divisive, issue for the Grand Chamber was Centro’s claim for 
over 2 billion euros just satisfaction (under Article 41 of the Convention). The company 
repeated its domestic claims for alleged loss of earnings and  additionally sought 10 
million euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The government believed the 
company’s claims were excessive. A bare majority of the Grand Chamber (nine votes to 
eight) determined that the Consiglio di Stato’s award of compensation to Centro could 
not be regarded as sufficient, particularly as no expert valuation had been ordered by 
the court. The majority accepted that Centro had lost earnings/profit as a result of the 
lengthy delay in the allocation of frequencies, but the majority considered that it was not 
possible to calculate a precise amount of pecuniary damage given the uncertainties of 
the company’s position. Centro had also suffered non-pecuniary damage and the Court: 
…may award pecuniary compensation for non-pecuniary damage to a commercial 
company. Non-pecuniary damage suffered by such companies may include aspects 
that are to a greater or lesser extent “objective” or “subjective”. Aspects that may 
be taken into account include the company’s reputation, uncertainty in decision-
planning, disruption in the management of the company (for which there is no 
precise method of calculating the consequences) and lastly, albeit to a lesser 
degree, the anxiety and inconvenience caused to the members of the management 
team…47 
Consequently the majority awarded a total sum of 10 million euros compensation to 
Centro. Four Judges48 issued a joint partly dissenting opinion in which they expressed 
the belief that the Grand Chamber should have sought an expert opinion on the losses of 
Centro. Furthermore, they considered that the commissioning of such an expert opinion 
would have facilitated a friendly settlement between the government and Centro. Judges 
Popovic and Mijovic concluded that Centro had lost its victim status as it had received 
compensation via the Italian courts and the Grand Chamber should have respected 
Italy’s margin of appreciation on the matter. 
 The judgment in Centro develops the Chamber ruling in Manole and others v 
Moldova49, by extending Member States’ positive obligation to secure plurality in the 
audiovisual media to the broadcasting of entertainment  programmes going beyond the 
coverage of political news and other topics of public interest. That echoes the original 
Court’s ruling that entertainment broadcasts, including pop music, fell within the right to 
freedom of expression in Groppera Radio AG v Switzerland50. However, we may 
speculate that it was the nature of Centro’s programming that led the Grand Chamber to 
refrain from requiring Italy to undertake systemic reform of its broadcasting regulatory 
regime, as advocated by the non-governmental third-party intervener, compared to its 
judgment in Manole. The Grand Chamber also avoided becoming entwined in domestic 
politics regarding the media power of Prime Minister Berlusconi by refusing to examine 
Centro’s Article 14 discrimination complaint. At the date of the hearing before the Grand 
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Chamber, 12 October 2011, he was still the Prime Minister. However, during the 
following month Berlusconi was forced to resign when he lost his parliamentary majority, 
as a consequence of the Italian debt crisis within the Eurozone. Nevertheless, the Grand 
Chamber’s conclusion that the relevant Italian legislation governing broadcasting, most 
of which had been enacted during his period in office, failed to meet the requirements of 
Article 10(2) was yet another European condemnation of that regulatory system. A 
diverse range of other European institutions from the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission51 to its Commissioner for Human Rights52 had previously expressed 
criticisms of the concentration of ownership and control of television broadcasting 
permitted by Italian law. More generally the judgment in Centro is another example of 
the Strasbourg Court working in harmony with the CJEU in their, currently, separate, but 
overlapping jurisdictions. The CJEU resisted the Consiglio di Stato’s request for the 
former to express a view on the application of Article 10 of the ECHR and the Strasbourg 
Grand Chamber subsequently took account of the CJEU’s critical opinion on the 
compatibility of Italian broadcasting legislation with EU law when determining if there 
had been a violation of Article 10. 
 There is substance in the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sajo and colleagues 
that the majority did not utilise the services of a financial expert to obtain a more 
accurate calculation of the amount of pecuniary damage suffered by Centro. This failure 
is even more inexplicable when we remember that the majority conclude that the 
compensation awarded by the Consiglio di Stato; “…cannot be regarded as sufficient, 
especially as no expert valuation was ordered by the domestic courts to quantify the 
losses sustained”! This case vividly discloses that the Court’s Article 41 responsibilities 
are not those of a “small claims court” and where large sums of compensation are at 
issue the Court should articulate and apply clear criteria supported in appropriate cases 
with expert financial advice. 
                                                          
51
 Opinion on the compatibility of the “Gasparri” and Frattini” laws of Italy with the Council of Europe 
standards in the field of freedom of expression and pluralism of the media”, 10-11 Jun. 2005. 
 
52
 Discussion paper on “Media Pluralism and human rights”, 6 Dec. 2011. 
 
